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Abstract
This is a rejoinder to the responses made to my paper ‘Against “immigrant integration”:
For an end to neocolonial knowledge production’, which was based on my
book Imagined Societies. A Critique of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe
(Cambridge University Press, 2017). Here, I aim to push the boundaries of our
discussion a bit further by arguing that the point is not to come up with better
concepts of ‘immigrant integration’. Rather, it is to recognize that any such concern with,
and for, ‘integration’ is already an imposition, and that, perhaps, the thing conventionally
called ‘migration studies’ should be seen as, itself, an imposition.
Keywords: Migration studies, Immigrant integration, Social science, Neocolonialism,
Europe
An indefensible position
There is nothing defensible in the concept of immigrant integration, and neither in
anything that purports to be an ‘alternative’ for it, since any such alternative is destined
to remain bound up with the very position from which social scientists once decreed
their findings concerning ‘integration’. ‘Integration’ itself is but one outgrowth of a
more general fetish with a position called ‘modernity’, an imagined project of ‘us’, the
civilized, secular, liberal, liberated who have the courtesy to take up the burden of
bringing ‘them’ up to speed, of including ‘them’ in what is inevitable anyway. That pos-
ition is indefensible. It is a twisted position, one that claims to be an epistemic position
but that is really only possible through the perpetuation of domination, of academic
but convertible forms of privilege, and of the active suppression of the imagination of
other modalities of living together. To problematize the ways we speak about ‘immi-
grant integration’ can never be a way to better calibrate the concept, to shore it up, or
to come up with alternatives. It must be a problematization of the very claim to the
position from which one might deploy such a concept or anything that could pass as
an ‘alternative’ to it. Whether that position announces itself by way of reference to a
certain ‘society’, or to ‘Europe’, to ‘the West’, or to ‘modernity’ (and it tends to be all of
these in mixed constitutions), the position is indefensible. It is indefensible because it
has always only been possible on the basis of the very work that ‘integration’ now does:
to identify the other, to manage her/him, in order to secure the order of ‘society’, of
‘Europe’, which has been possible only through histories of capitalist expansion and
colonial plunder. Any claim to a purely epistemic position is undercut by the sheer fact
that the reference categories we are invested in (‘society’, ‘Europe’, ‘universal humanity’)
are historical categories, and we are enlisted in the state work that seeks to reaffirm
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them, to reproduce their plausibility, their ahistoricity, their legitimacy. If we can learn
anything from this exchange, it might be that we are all, each of us and in different
ways, invested in a position that is, ultimately, indefensible and not in our or in
anyone’s interest. And if we want to learn more, the only way is to listen to voices of
those who, by fate or fortune, have had to liberate themselves from that position. These
voices undercut our entire discussion, revealing the clumsiness of our disagreements,
our amateurism in grappling with vocabularies – race, whiteness, coloniality – and our
just-on-the-sceneness when it comes to reconceiving the very conceptions of human
sociality and of the world that we are always already invested in, always already working
within and outward from. At least, when I speak for myself, I am a novice. Long before
I was born Aimé Césaire had said it all: “Europe is indefensible” (Césaire, 2000, p. 32).
It took me 15 years in academia to get to it (and I blame both myself and the structure
of ‘academia’ for this), and to even start to grapple with this predicament of that which
enables everything in the production of which I have participated. Fanon said it too:
“Europe is literally the creation of the Third World” (Fanon, 2002, p. 99). How apt a
description of the productivity of so much of what we have nobly termed ‘migration
studies’! Or, in yet another way, I am struck by a structural similarity when Sylvia
Wynter writes about the postcolonial condition:
“the West is now going to reincorporate us neocolonially, and thereby mimetically,
by telling us that the problem with us wasn’t that we’d been imperially subordinated,
wasn’t that we’d been both socioculturally dominated and economically exploited,
but that we were underdeveloped” (Wynter, 2015, p. 20).
I can imagine the migration scholar think ‘but that’s got nothing to do with our
efforts to chart immigrant integration or diversity!’ But has it really? Don’t these very
concepts only make sense by always already accepting what are ultimately political con-
cepts, political conceptions of this ‘society’, of this ‘Europe’, as if these are givens. My
entry point into discussions about what is gathered under the broad rubric of ‘migra-
tion’ has always been that it is impossible to treat conceptions of collectivity as givens,
and to then chart what goes on ‘in’, across, or between such collectivities under the
name of ‘migration’. The point is that we don’t have a conception of ‘society’ without it
being an effect of a whole host of problematizations that go by the name of ‘migration’
and that are enacted by state apparatuses, some of which are academic. And with those
problematizations come a host of other conceptions, of subjectivity and even of
humanity, that social scientists tend not to question with the result that they end up
reifying historically particular, Western-centric notions as if these were universals. Tak-
ing the ‘science’ part in ‘social science’ seriously means precisely to question the most
taken-for-granted conceptions, and to come up with alienating vocabularies and some-
times bewildering findings, in order to escape the constant threat of what Bourdieu
(2012) called ‘state thought’.
“No conflicts of interest were reported by the author”...
So between me and at least some of my interlocutors, discussion really already
dries up if it should be about what happens when people ‘settle in a society’ or
when ‘migration’ is considered not as an effect of an elaborate state work of
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visualization (Dijstelbloem, van Reekum, & Schinkel, 2017; van Reekum & Schinkel,
2017) but as ‘people moving from one country to another’. And discussion dries
up when it should be about defending existing notions of integration or diversity
or about coming up with alternatives that, under conditions of acceptance of state
conceptions of collectivity and of migration (‘people moving’), inevitably end up
operating in functionally equivalent ways. So there is really no way to respond to
proposals for ‘relational integration’ without rehearsing the fact that such notions
reproduce all the problems inherent in the very idea of an ‘integration’ analytically
separable from what would be a ‘society’ (what else would that yield than a re(in)statement
of ‘modernization theory’?), as is the case in Lea Maria Klarenbeek's (2019) response. The
same goes for Rinus Penninx's (2019) effort to save immigrant integration research. In his
response, he appears to presume that ‘whiteness’ is a concept that refers to skin color.
And it is precisely such a resistance to learning from others (he might start with an inter-
view one of the editors of this journal conducted with bell hooks: Grünell & Saharso,
1999) that is so problematic also when people coin concepts like ‘super-diversity’.
Fran Meissner's (2019) eloquent and measured critique of my intervention rightly
points out that I don’t discuss the strongest possible version of ‘super-diversity’, and that
there are many. That is true. In a recent metastudy, Steven Vertovec, who coined the con-
cept, groups the following seven ways in which it is used: “a contemporary synonym of di-
versity, a backdrop for a study, a call for methodological reassessment, a way of simply
talking about more ethnicity, a multidimensional reconfiguration of social forms, a call to
move beyond ethnicity, and a device for drawing attention to new social complexities”
(Vertovec, 2019, p. 125). Quite apart from the fact that the ‘discovery’ of the other is the
discovery of ‘complexity’ (there’s super-diversity now, but things were so much simpler
when whiteness was so ubiquitous that it didn’t even show up), I would say the concept is
‘used’ in yet another way: as a way of not seriously speaking about race and power. Why,
in the face of so much work by critical race scholars and postcolonial scholars, would
‘super-diversity’ be the new rallying concept if not for the many disavowals and political
neutralizations it affords while at the same time providing continuity – even ‘progress’, ‘in-
creasing insight’ or whatever – in the careers of migration scholars? The disavowal of his-
tory is one issue here, for the idea that now there’s ‘super-diversity’ exists only as ex post
facto affirmation and reification of everything it claims to now complexify, and under con-
ditions of the ahistoricity of its conceptual elements. The disavowal and displacement of
race is perhaps the most obvious and pertinent. And, as Ahmed (2012) has illustrated, is
that not exactly the way ‘diversity’ operates in the university, in the very (infra)structures
that organize the production of knowledge about ‘super-diversity’?
Even if, as Vertovec says, ‘super-diversity’ was coined to call attention to “new
hierarchical social positions, statuses or stratifications” (Vertovec, 2019, p. 126), it was ut-
terly redundant given the wealth of concepts and insights coming from disciplines such as
critical race studies, Black Studies and postcolonial studies. Its success, even in its most
reflexive versions, I would venture, has to do with the apolitical and hence policy-friendly
blandness the word ‘super-diversity’ evokes and with the concomitant disavowals that the
concept ‘super-diversity’ enacts. So perhaps one could say that all seven ways of using
‘super-diversity’ share a common interest, meaning that there is something unintentionally
disingenuous to the disclosure statement following Vertovec’s paper (and so many others):
“No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author” (Vertovec, 2019, p. 136).
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In that respect, the position taken by Leila Hadj Abdou (2019) is very sympathetic:
‘immigrant integration’ and, I would add, ‘super-diversity’, says more about those inter-
ested in it than about those whose condition or status it purports to describe. It is, she
contends, a form of ‘governance of ethno-cultural differences’. I can concur, although I
would prefer a concept over governmentality over against the neo-liberal jargon of
‘governance’, even though I see that it is precisely under conditions of neo-liberalism
that a particular modality of governing prevails, as Hadj Abdou (2019) illustrates with
respect to urban government. The point of my intervention was precisely to recognize
the ongoing academic complicity, even across what the field considers to be progress
by way of different integration concepts or by replacing such concepts by concepts of
(super-)diversity. And my aim was to not merely note that complicity but to specify it
as a neo-colonial modality of government and to denounce it. I believe Adrian Favell's
(2019) 12 theses are very much in line with this, and, by way of placing bordering pro-
cesses front and center, they point to a possible way forward. So does Meissner's (2019)
call to be attentive to the various ways in which methods enact realities, which has
been central to my own work in recent years.
At the same time, there is a more fundamental unease here. In a way, any attempt to
academically accept the state-mediated ‘object’ of ‘migration’ and to start to meddle
with those whom it is thought to concern, as if poking an alien life form to see if it is
in fact alive, is an imposition in, and on, the social world, an imposition that is the
product of an active choice not to recognize the entanglement that allows one to do
this and to reify the separation that state-thought imposes but that is always illusory.
There is a certain violence already in the purely intra-academic, routinized yet arbitrary
normalcy with which one decides ‘I’m going to study this’ and starts to produce ‘know-
ledge’ about those people that state-thought construes as the subjects (and hence
objects) of ‘migration’. In order to be attuned to this violence, many of us must learn
to learn, by bringing in voices that tend to be little heard in ‘migration studies’. Apart
from those already mentioned here, I believe that, in Europe at least, one voice that
deserves our undivided attention is Houria Bouteldja’s.
Dismantling integrationism: Houria Bouteldja’s Whites, Jews and Us
In Whites, Jews and Us: Toward a Politics of Revolutionary Love (2017), Houria Bouteldja
undercuts anything European academics might conduct by way of discussion about the
‘problem’ of ‘migration’ and ‘migrant settlement’ in Europe – and I’m deliberately phras-
ing this in the broadest sense possible. Bouteldja, one of the founders of Indigènes de la
République, occupies a position outside of the terrain of positionality of ‘debates about
immigration’ in Europe, and for this reason, her book is an act of generosity and a
pedagogy. Whites, Jews, and Us is written against the European ‘Left’. But when she speaks
of a political-ideological apparatus she calls the ‘white immune system’, it is clear that the
notion of the ‘Left’ is restrictive and that ‘migration studies’ can be readily perceived to be
part of this immune system – even without giving credence to right-wing accusations of
‘left-wing academia’, because even a generously expansive conception of ‘the Left’ as
including social-democratic positions does not capture all that exists under the umbrella
of migration studies. What does this ‘white immune system’ consist of? It is, first and fore-
most, characterized by innocence. Obviously, everything that now goes by the name of ‘in-
tegration’ or ‘diversity’ has its historical antecedents in colonial history, and what are now
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called ‘immigrants’ in Europe are in so many ways part of the delayed, or ongoing,
responses to the initial plunder conducted in the name of Europe – “they were born
wretched of the earth, and they ended up immigrants” (Bouteldja, 2017, p. 104). Yet the
language of otherness unleashed on ‘immigrants’ is riddled with best intentions. Best in-
tentions aimed at ‘improving’ the ‘situation of immigrants’, at furthering their ‘integration’,
their ‘inclusion’ or their ‘mobility’, and best intentions aiming at ‘policy-relevance’, are the
jargon of whiteness that communicates ‘innocence’. Recalibrating what Baldwin (1998, p.
604) called Europe’s ‘racial innocence’, this innocence, for Bouteldja as for Wekker (2016),
is a ‘white innocence’. As Bouteldja says: “Paradoxically, you ‘discover’ that you are white
– especially the French – when we call you ‘white’. In reality, you discover nothing. You
simply recoil at being named, situated, your guilt thereby uncovered and your immunity
rendered vulnerable” (Bouteldja, 2017, p. 42). And so we might get away too easily as
academics when we generously ‘turn the tables’ and critically consider those who have an
interest in ‘integration’ and ‘super-diversity’ unless we do so in a language that recognizes
the workings of whiteness as a mode of domination. If we don’t, we end up congratulating
ourselves with our reflexivity and sophistication, a chauvinism of guilt that ends up
reinforcing what Bouteldja describes as the ‘fortress’ of whiteness. That fortress is
strengthened by what she calls the ‘political-ideological apparatus’ that is the ‘white
immune system’:
“Through it, many antibodies have been secreted. Among them, humanism and the
monopoly of ethics. You are the greatest antiracists. Haven’t you, time and time
again, celebrated the struggle of Martin Luther King against segregation? You are the
most appalled by anti-Semitism. (…) You are the greatest anticolonialists. Didn’t you
prostrate yourselves before the courage and abnegation of Nelson Mandela? (…) You
are the greatest feminists. Didn’t you devote your attention to the fate of Afghan
women and promise to save them from the Taliban’s claws? You are the most anti-
homophobic. Didn’t you rush head first to the defense of homosexuals in the Arab
world? How could we possibly climb to your level? We are gnomes, you are giants.”
(Bouteldja, 2017, pp. 43–44)
Indeed, from the fortress of whiteness it has been possible to do all that, to embrace
humanism, equality, ethics, anti-racism, feminism, anti-homophobia, and to nonethe-
less occupy a sovereign position from which to poke at ‘others’ and fortify particular
privileges (euphemized as ‘policy-relevant research’), and even to denounce all that as
‘neo-colonial’! But, Bouteldja says, the immune system is weakening. It is weakening
because it becomes clear that it was, in the first place, based on a ‘deal’ with capital.
Here, Bouteldja’s argument runs along similar lines to that of W.E.B. Du Bois, when he
spoke of a ‘public, psychological wage’ that accrued to those who understood them-
selves as ‘white’ (Du Bois, 1935, pp. 700–701; cf. Du Bois, 2007, p. 14). The deal was:
participate in white supremacy and get a few crumbs of capital, but by any means don’t
form an antagonism against capital across what Du Bois called ‘the color line’.
Bouteldja rightly sees this deal falter in our time, and so the entire project of ‘integrat-
ing’ people in a ‘welfare state’ is rapidly becoming an anachronism. And this offers op-
portunities, because social democracy only ever was a way of consolidating what
Roediger (2007), following Du Bois, has called the ‘wages of whiteness’. And Bouteldja
Schinkel Comparative Migration Studies            (2019) 7:32 Page 5 of 8
offers another vocabulary altogether to speak about the potential meeting of what, up
to now, have been racial interests:
“I no longer believe that this series of missed encounters between you and immigration
were simply due to coincidence. I am beginning to understand that the site of a real
encounter can only happen at the crossroads of our mutual interests – the fear of civil
war and chaos – the site where races could annihilate each other and where it is
possible to imagine our equal dignity. Because I tend to give in to sentimentality, I
wonder if this isn’t the space of love. Revolutionary love.” (Bouteldja, 2017, pp. 49–50)
Love is a thoroughly un-academic way of speaking about sociality as entanglement,
as being-together. That is its strength. What passes as ‘scientific knowledge’ in matters
of migration, integration and super-diversity has, up to now, been possible by way of
participating in the governing of the white fortress. It has been predicated on the very
claim to be able to ‘produce knowledge’ about others from positions of privilege, to
which those very same ‘others’ were, by and large, refused entry. And it has been legiti-
mated by the good will to power according to which all efforts were directed at ‘inclu-
sion’, at giving access to those lofty positions of power-knowledge to those others. But
this is the situation of Europe: there was a deal with capital, and it is fading. There are
movements of consolidation, and as part of this new forms of fascism are on the rise,
sometimes euphemistically called ‘alt-right’, sometimes simply called ‘populism’. And
then there are those who work in universities and state-led research institutes to study
as best as possible the ‘complexity’ of a world no longer characterized by the illusion of
sameness that the deal with capital gave credibility to. ‘Bazaar sociologists’ is Bouteldja’s
word for them, for us. ‘Self-proclaimed experts’ (Bouteldja, 2017, p. 110). Indeed, what
else is this thing we call ‘autonomous science’ but a self-proclamation that enables the
continued production of self-same so-called ‘top scientists’?
Is that cynical? I honestly don’t think that that’s the cynical part of this story. It is rather
illegible from within the research community. Bouteldja, certainly, is speaking from a
position that is nearly illegible from within the European migration apparatus: a position
of indigeneity. In France, this is a productive affront because it is deemed an impossibility
given the ‘Republican’ idea(l) that everyone is ‘French’, which has always been a European
example of the ways ‘equality’ can be a mode of naturalizing racial hierarchies (cf.
Hartman, 1997). In other Western-European countries, it is an affront because it is
considered a position that should be abandoned, and the very abandonment of this
position is what concepts such as ‘integration’ and ‘modernity’ are meant to describe, even
though they keep on reproducing it in a purely asymmetrical and ascribed way. Bouteldja,
on the other hand, claims indigeneity, owns it, and severs it from anything that state appara-
tuses such as ‘migration studies’ would seek to ascribe to it. For Bouteldja and her com-
rades, indigeneity exists in France, because France was, and is, a colonial state. And, as she
recounts, she has never felt as free as when she started to use these words: indigeneity,
whiteness, colonialism: “ever since then, we’ve provoked hatred, violence, fear, and respect.
But never paternalism. Not a single person opens their mouth to talk to us about integra-
tion” (Bouteldja, 2017, pp. 118–119). That’s what it took to silence the ‘integration’ chatter.
It took the shock of shattering an immune system so ‘scientifically’ validated. Now, picture a
meeting between Bouteldja and some representatives of the cutting edge and the
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state-of-the-art of migration studies, the latter explaining to her, with all the weighty earn-
estness in which academic prestige is donned, that it’s really all very complex nowadays:
‘you see, we now live in a super-diverse condition’. What could be more ridiculous, and
more ridiculously blind to the impudent imposition ‘migration studies’ was and is?
The entire atmosphere of Bouteldja’s intervention – and she herself reports an experi-
ence of ‘suffocating’ – is one of the complete and utter denunciation of anything dom-
inant institutions purport to produce under the heading of ‘knowledge’ about those
calibrated as ‘immigrants’. Of course, the ‘scientist’ will shove this intervention aside –
it’s not ‘neutral’, not ‘objective’, after all. But are there also ways of becoming attuned to
the ways in which the very practice and definition of what we, as academics, claim to
do, is already an imposition?
All there is
We have, over time, refined and recalibrated our vocabularies, our classifications, our
techniques. We have gone from ‘guest workers’ to ‘minorities’, some of us have dabbled
in ‘race relations’, others in ‘integration’, yet others have favored ‘assimilation’, and cur-
rently many are adopting versions of ‘diversity’ as in ‘super-diversity’. At each step, it
made for extensions of CV’s, leading to papers, books, edited collections, conferences,
networks, trips abroad, wining and dining. That this circle of career building through
intra-academic grooming, well-funded through the extra-academic grooming that goes
by the name of ‘policy relevance’, could continue for so long has to do with the fact that
it occurred under the protective umbrella of ‘Science’, of the fiction of discovery and
the accumulation of knowledge that none of us ever honestly felt had really reserved a
place for us but that nonetheless figured as the horizon legitimating our endeavors. But
frankly, I’m not buying it anymore. There’s no room for recalibration here, for
fine-tuning, for nuance, for getting a better empirical fit or for overhauling, once again,
the parameters of the system through which we reward ourselves. I’m not buying that
‘super-diversity’ is an incremental step on the right track, that it is an advance, an
improvement, that it abandons the problematic and indefensible position that holds
that we are always beholden to positionality, always held by a collective of which we
already have the name, be it ‘society’ or ‘Europe’ or ‘modernity’ or even ‘equality’.
You see, there has to come a point at which, when we recognize that the subjects of
our concerns, our studies, don’t recognize themselves in the terms of those concerns
and don’t think of themselves as ‘integrated’ or as (part of anything) ‘super-diverse’, or
as ‘immigrant’ or as ‘refugee’, as ‘modern’ or not, we need to confess, in good STS spirit,
that we have invented whole categories of beings. And if we have invented them but if
they don’t find recognition by those to whom we assume the categories apply, then at
some point we need to account for our inventions, to account for why we invented
them in the first place, and to account for the ways we have helped invent categories
that allow the free reign of fear to attach to them – and isn’t this what marks our era
in Western countries first and foremost? Isn’t this what self-servingly legitimates our
inventions as contributions to the management of people to whom categories of fear
are attached? And so we may be asked why we invented these categories, and not other
things. And we may be asked why we invented them ourselves, by ourselves, as a way
of inventing ourselves, and not in common collaboration with those to whom we
deemed our inventions applicable.
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Some of my interlocutors worry that I have not gone far enough in sketching out an
alternative route. But what if the alternative is just another shape of the imposition that
migration studies constitutes? What if an alternative would be the imposition of, in yet
another way, clinging to the very idea of positions and positionality that ordered the
empirical ‘thing’ that can be called ‘migration’ in the first place? Insofar as what is
called ‘migration studies’ is an extended accretion of resources and privileges, I am
happy not to sketch out an alternative at all. I’d rather simply go and do something
else. To be ‘unscientific’, yes please! There are too many things I have to learn. So many
generous offers for living together in dignity are on the table: conviviality, commoning,
composition – these are concepts of cum rather than of in, of being-with rather than
being in- or outside. Ultimately, they are modalities of the offer sketched by Bouteldja,
the offer of love, revolutionary love. And that is all.
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